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EX-FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON
THE BLACK VOTE: THE NEED FOR A SECOND LOOK
ALICE E. HARVEyt
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of
a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart
of representative government.1
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the right to vote is regarded as an essential
element of liberty, freedom, and self-expression. The ability to
exercise the franchise lies at the very root of citizenship2 and is
zealously guarded by those who have struggled to gain its privilege.'
However, even in this day and age of equality for all, not every
citizen is entitled to participate in the electoral process. The several
states still retain the power to restrict the franchise,4 thereby
t B.S. 1991, Drexel University;J.D. Candidate 1994, University of Pennsylvania.
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' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
2 See James B. Jacobs, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 27
(1983) (noting the "centrality of the franchise to the meaning of citizenship").
'This is particularly true in the case of women and minorities. See Eric Foner,
From Slavery to Citizenship: Blacks and the Right to Vote, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF VOTING AND VOTING RIGHTS IN
AMERICA 54,54-65 (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1990) [hereinafter VOTING AND THE SPIRIT
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY]; see also infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text (noting
the struggle by minorities to acquire voting rights and the attempts by primarily white
governments to stop them).
" The Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants the states some control
over the franchise. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing each state a republican
form of government); see also Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 39 (1988) (noting that
although numerous provisions of the Constitution have been interpreted to grant
Congress the power to overturn state election practices, "the guarantee clause... still
assures the states some control over the franchise"). For instance, states may restrict
voting to property owners in certain elections and establish residency requirements
for all state and local elections. See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 730-35 (1973) (upholding a California statute that
permitted only landowners to vote in water storage district elections); Marston v.
Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 680 (1973) (upholding Arizona's 50-day durational residency
requirement for state and local elections as "necessary to achieve the State's legitimate
goals" of preparing accurate voter lists).
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excluding certain groups of individuals. Convicted felons comprise
one such group.
5
To date, fifteen American states permanently disenfranchise ex-
felons.6 While some authorities have condemned the disenfran-
chisement of ex-felons, 7 typical arguments overlook one important
' Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to confer
authority upon states to disenfranchise persons convicted for "participation in
rebellion, or other crime." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality of states disen-
franchising felons on the basis of § 2). But see infra text accompanying notes 93-94
(notingJustice Marshall's criticism of the use of § 2 to disenfranchise).
6 Some states disenfranchise all felons, while others exclude only those who have
committed enumerated offenses or "infamous crimes." See ALA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 182 (disqualifying from voting "those who shall be convicted of treason, murder,
arson, embezzlement, malfeasance in office, larceny, receiving stolen property...
robbery ... burglary, forgery, bribery"); ARIZ. CONST. art. 7, § 2 ("No person ...
convicted of treason or felony [shall] be qualified to vote in any election .... ."); DEL.
CONST. art. V, § 2 ("[N]o ... person convicted of a crime deemed by law felony...
shall enjoy the right of an elector ... ."); FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 ("No person
convicted of a felony.., shall be qualified to vote. .. ."); IOWA CONST. art. 2, § 5
("No... person convicted of any infamous crime shall be entitled to the privileges
of an elector."); KY. CONST. § 145 (excluding from the vote "[p]ersons convicted...
of treason, or felony, or bribery in an election"); MD. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The General
Assembly by law may... prohibit the right to vote of a person convicted of infamous
or other serious crime. .. ."); MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 241 (disenfranchising persons
"convicted of murder, rape, bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under
false pretense, perjury, forgery, embezzlement, or bigamy"); NEV. CONST. art. 2,,§ 1
("[N]o person who has been.., convicted of treason or felony.., shall be entitled
to the privilege of an elector."); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 11 (disenfranchising persons
convicted of treason, bribery, and election offenses only); N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1
(disqualifying "persons convicted of a felonious or infamous crime" from voting);
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (denying suffrage to persons convicted of "infamous
crimes"); UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (disenfranchising persons committing treason and
election offenses only); VA. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("No person who has been convicted
of a felony shall be qualified to vote.... ."); WYO. CONST. art. 6, § 6 ("All... persons
convicted of infamous crimes.., are excluded from the elective franchise."); see also
Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "The Purity of
the Ballot Box," 102 HARv. L. REv. 1300, 1300 n.1 (1989) (challenging ex-felon disen-
franchisement generally). While the number of black felons and the degree of black
vote dilution may vary among these states, this Comment addresses the problem from
a broader, more theoretical perspective, and also examines the six states where the
impact of felon disenfranchisement statutes on the black vote is greatest. See infra
note 12 & part I.
' See generally Note, supra note 6, at 1300-17 (attacking policy concerns and
politicaljustifications for ex-felon disenfranchisement). See also Howard Itzkowitz &
Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender's Right to Vote: Background and
Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 721-757 (1973) (condemning ex-felon
disenfranchisement as contrary to society's criminal rehabilitative goals); Gary L.
Reback, Note, Disenfranchisement ofEx-felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 845,
845-64 (1973) (attacking the constitutionality of ex-felon disenfranchisement).
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aspect of the problem-the impact of this disenfranchisement on the
black vote. In 1985, the issue was addressed for the first time by a
Tennessee federal district court in Wesley v. Collins.' In Wesley, the
plaintiff, a black convicted felon, argued that a Tennessee statute
disenfranchising felons resulted in the unlawful dilution of the black
vote in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the federal Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982.' Because the court dismissed the
plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a claim,'0 the many issues
raised by Wesley went largely unresolved. This Comment will
explore some of these issues in arguing that the disenfranchisement
of ex-felons" deserves closer judicial scrutiny because of its
potential to impermissibly dilute black voting power.
1 2
Part I of this Comment examines the problem from a statistical
standpoint in order to show that, due to the disproportionate
percentage of black convicted felons removed from the already
limited pool of eligible black voters, ex-felon disenfranchisement
negatively impacts the black vote. In addition, Part I looks at
certain felon-disenfranchising states where, due to the larger
number of blacks imprisoned compared to whites in proportion to
total population for each group, there is a significant impact on the
black vote. While such an analysis might be met with a generally
B 605 F. Supp. 802 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
' Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(a)-(b) (1988)); see also Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 804-14. According to the amend-
ments to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a plaintiff need only show that a challenged
statute has the result of denying minorities "an equal chance to participate in the
political process." S. REP. NO. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 193. Thus, the amendments effectively lessened the burden
imposed upon minority vote dilution plaintiffs by City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980), which required proof of discriminatory intent in § 2 cases. See id. at 69-70.
In Bolden, a class action suit was brought on behalf of all black citizens of the city of
Mobile challenging the city's at-large system of municipal elections. See id. at 58.
10 See Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 814.
" The terms "felon" and "ex-felon" are used interchangeably throughout this
Comment to refer to those who have been convicted of a felony and have been
released from prison (except when referring to current prison population statistics).
12 Stated simply, vote dilution occurs when a statute or electoral practice results
in denying minorities "an equal chance to participate in the political process." S. REP.
No. 417, supra note 9, at 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 193. I am not
necessarily arguing that felon disenfranchisement unlawfully dilutes the black vote in
every state listed in note 6, supra. Rather, I am adopting a broad approach to the
problem in arguing that certain factors, many of which the Wesley court brushed
aside, must be given greater emphasis when assessing the impact of felon disen-
franchisement on the black vote. Also, in certain states that still disenfranchise
felons, a significant impact on the black vote may be evidence, although not
dispositive, of black vote dilution. See infra part I.A.
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unsympathetic reception,"3 Part I also addresses possible reasons
for the disproportionate imprisonment figures, namely the disparate
targeting and treatment of blacks by the criminal justice system.
Part II describes the general arguments advanced against the
disenfranchisement of ex-felons and analyzes the significance of
black status to such arguments. Part III explores the particular
applicability of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to cases such as
Wesley' 4 involving alleged vote-diluting ex-felon disenfranchisement
statutes, and argues for the inclusion of and special emphasis on
certain factors-specifically those described in Parts I and II as well
as evidence of socioeconomic and voting discrimination-in the Act's
"totality of circumstances" analysis. 5 Part III also criticizes the
Wesley decision for its faulty analysis under the Voting Rights Act.
Finally, in proposing a possible approach for future courts to pursue
"s Indeed, some would argue that the mere fact that a disproportionate number
of blacks are convicted of felonies deserves little attention, since the decision to
commit a crime is an individual one, and felon disenfranchisement statutes obviously
do not directly interfere with the voting rights of non-felons. See Wesley, 605 F. Supp.
at 813 ("Felons are ... disenfranchised based on ... their conscious decision to
commit an act for which they assume the risks of... punishment."). But see infra
notes 163-65 and accompanying text (examining the link between adverse social
conditions and criminal acts); infra part I.B.2 (examining the significance of black
status in imprisonment rates).
" Although the plaintiff in Wesley also alleged violation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, this Comment focuses specifically on challenges brought
under the Voting Rights Act. The constitutional intent standard applied in
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment cases may be very difficult to meet, as
Congress recognized in amending § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In addition, since
"[a] finding of liability under section two would obviate the necessity to decide...
plaintiffs' Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims," Voting Rights Act claims are
more likely to succeed. Lee County Branch of the NAACP v. City of Opelika, 748
F.2d 1473, 1478 (1984) (footnote omitted). Furthermore, as the Lee court observed,
"if... plaintiffs cannot prevail under the generally more easily proved 'results'
standard of section 2, it is unlikely that they could prevail on their constitutional
claims in any event." Id. at 1478 n.7. Part II, however, explores the general
constitutional arguments against ex-felon disenfranchisement and recommends a
different approach to the constitutional intent standard in discrimination cases.
"h Section 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act Amendments provides that vote dilution
in violation of the Act is established if
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by [the Act] in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). The details of this analysis, including the specific factors
to be weighed in the "totality of circumstances" test, are discussed in Part M of this
Comment.
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in examining vote dilution claims against ex-felon disenfranchise-
ment, Part HI suggests that the strong presence of the above-
mentioned factors should be presumed to work in conjunction with
the particular ex-felon disenfranchising statute to impermissibly
dilute the black vote under the Voting Rights Act.
I. THE PROBLEM IN NUMBERS
All fifteen disenfranchisement statutes now in existence 16 apply
equally to felons of all races. The district court in Wesley rejected
the plaintiff's contention that because a greater percentage of blacks
than whites are convicted of felonies in Tennessee,"7 the disenfran-
chising statute dilutes black voting strength in violation of the
Voting Rights Act.' However, the court of appeals noted that
although a showing of disproportionate racial impact, as evidenced
by statistical data, is not solely sufficient to establish vote dilution
in violation of the Voting Rights Act,' 9 such impact nonetheless
should prompt a judicial inquiry into the "interaction of the
challenged legislation 'with historical, social and political factors
generally probative of dilution. '"' 2 Evidence of disproportionate
racial impact is not to be simply disregarded, as the district court
indicated.2 '
6 See supra note 6 (listing the ex-felon disenfranchisment provisions in 15 state
constitutions).
" Specifically, the plaintiff in Wesley presented evidence demonstrating that "the
ratio of white felons to the general population of Tennessee whites [was] approxi-
mately I to 1000, while the corresponding black ratio [was] 1 to 100." Wesley, 605 F.
Supp. at 804.
s See id. at 807 ("[R]elative to the potential voting strength of whites, the number
of blacks of voting age is disproportionately reduced by Tennessee's disenfranchise-
ment of felons .... ").
19 See Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that "[i]t
is well-settled ... that a showing of disproportionate racial impact alone does not
establish a per se violation of the Voting Rights Act"). For a thorough discussion of
the Voting Rights Act and its analytical framework, see infra part III.20 Id. at 1261 (quoting Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 354 (E.D.N.C.
1984)). In essence, according to the Wesley court of appeals, data showing
disproportionate impact automatically prompt a Voting Rights Act analysis ofpossible
vote dilution.
21 Although the district court found that the Tennessee act did indeed dispropor-
tionately impact blacks, that fact seemed to get lost in the court's misdirected search
for a causal nexus between the "indicia of historically-rooted discrimination and the
Tennessee statute disenfranchising felons." Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 812. Part I of
this Comment attacks the Wesley court's causal nexus approach and argues that
statistical data showing impact should be weighed in the Voting Rights Act "totality
of circumstances" analysis.
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As demonstrated in the following analysis, when the relatively
large percentage of black convicted felons is compared to the small
percentage of the general population that blacks represent nation-
wide, 2 and the even smaller black voting age population, it
becomes clear that disenfranchisement of ex-felons has a significant
impact on black voting power. In certain disenfranchising states,
this impact is enhanced by a disproportionate ratio of black
prisoners to white prisoners in relation to total statewide population
for each group. In these areas, the propensity for vote dilution is
particularly great. While such strong statistical evidence of
disproportionate impact cannot by itself establish vote dilution,
23
it nevertheless deserves greater weight than that afforded by the
Wesley court.
A. Statistical Evidence
The 1990 census reported that 29,986,060 of a total 248,709,878
Americans are black, compared to 199,686,070 white citizens.
24
Blacks account for roughly 12.1% of the total U.S. population,
compared to the 80.3% white population. 5 Of greater importance,
however, is the black voting age population which, in 1988,26 was
estimated to be 9,171,000,27 or approximately 4% of the current
' While nationwide figures are obviously larger than similar statistics for any one
state, national statistics are presented to demonstrate disproportionate impact on a
broad scale, and thus to emphasize the need for greater judicial deference to
statistical evidence in ex-felon disenfranchisement vote dilution cases. Figures for
certain states are also included to show areas where felon disenfranchisement has its
greatest impact on the black vote.
' Again, it should be remembered that the following statistics are offered to show
impact, not to show vote dilution which must be established through Voting Rights
Act analysis. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. These figures should not
only prompt the initial analysis but should be factored into the analysis. See infra part
III.C.
24 
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUSING: SUMMARY POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS
59 (1992) [hereinafter 1990 CENSUS]. Federal and state prisoners are included in this
number. See id. at D-2.
2 See NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, INC., THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1992, at 310
(1992).
21 The most recent estimates of black voting age population found are for 1988.




total population.2 8  Of that number of eligible black voters,
5,842,000 blacks, or 63.7%, were registered to vote.
2 9
According to the most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulle-
tin,"° blacks represented 47% of a total 829,344 convicted fel-
ons3 2 and 48% of felons convicted of violent crimes33 in 1990,
although they made up only 12.1% of the U.S. adult population in
that year.34  Comparatively, whites represented 52% of total
convicted felons,35 although they made up 80.3% of the total
population in 1990." Furthermore, because approximately 90% of
all convicted felons in 1990 were of voting age, 7 it may be safely
assumed that most of those black convicted felons were of voting
age.
Of even greater relevance to the problem of black vote dilution
are the data which show that in some of the states that still
disenfranchise felons, the black population is much lower than the
white population and the number of blacks imprisoned is compara-
tively high. As the following table indicates, in six states that disen-
franchise ex-felons,3" blacks comprise a larger portion of the prison
population than do whites, while representing a much smaller
portion of the total population.
3 9
28 Based on total U.S. population for 1990 of 248,709,873, the exact percentage
of voting-age blacks is 3.69% of the total population. See 1990 CENSUS, supra note 24,
at 59.
2 See HORTON & SMrrH, supra note 26, at 480.30 PATRICK A. LANGAN & JOHN M. DAWSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BULLETIN: FELONYSENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1990 (1993). This
report is issued approximately every two years.
s1 See id. at 5.
s2 See id. at 2. This figure is based on state-court felony convictions, which
accounted for 96% of all felony convictions in the United States in 1990. See id. It
is estimated thatan additional 36,686 felons were convicted by federal courts in 1990.
See id.
" See id. at 5. Violent crimes are listed as murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault. See id. at 1.
M See 1990 CENSUS, supra note 24, at 59.
35 See LANGAN & DAWSON, supra note 30, at 5.
' See 1990 CENSUS, supra note 24, at 59.
3
7 See LANGAN & DAWSON, supra note 30, at 5.
" For a list of all the states that disenfranchise felons, see supra note 6.
'9 These six states are by no means the only states where felon disenfranchisement
may have significant impact on the black vote. Even in states like Tennessee, where
the number of blacks imprisoned in 1985 was marginally less than the number of
whites (3153 black prisoners compared to 3904 white prisoners), see BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1985, at 57 (1987), the Wesley court found an impact on the black
vote. See Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 812 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (conceding that
1994) 1151
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TABLE 1
Proportion of Black and White Prisoners to Total Black and White
Population for Selected States, 1990 '
Total Total
Black Black White White
State Population Prisoners Percent Population Prisoners Percent
Alabama 1,020,705 9,893 0.9% 2,975,797 5,764 0.2%
Delaware 112,460 2,268 2.0% 535,094 1,137 0.2%
Florida 1,759,534 25,385 1.4% 10,749,285 18,206 0.2%
Maryland 1,189,899 13,771 1.2% 3,393,964 3,973 0.1%
Mississippi 915,057 5,965 0.7% 1,633,461 2,360 0.1%
Virginia 1,162,994 11,189 1.0% 4,791,739 6,306 0.1%
Also, it should be noted that if the national black voting age
population constitutes only 4% of the total population, and is thus
lower than the 12% total black population, it follows that the black
voting age population in each of these states is even lower than the
total statewide black population figures shown above. Furthermore,
statistics show that in 1986, more than half of the state prison
inmates nationwide were serving time for the commission of violent
crimes,4 1 and in 1990, blacks comprised 48% of felons nationwide
who were convicted of violent crimes. 42 Therefore, one would
expect that many of the blacks imprisoned in state prisons have
committed a disenfranchising crime.
43
"the Tennessee Act disproportionately impacts on blacks"), a~fd, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th
Cir. 1986). Because the figures are so radically skewed in these states, however, they
present a good example of how felon disenfranchisement may have a profound
impact on black voting power. See infra text accompanying notes 52-53 (describing
the potential impact of felon disenfranchisement in Florida).
o Information obtained from the 1990 CENSUS, supra note 24, at 59, and BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1990, at 83 (1992).41 See CHRISTOPHER A. INNES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PROFILE OF STATE PRISON INMATES, 1986, at 3 (1988)
(citing the number of state prison inmates convicted of violent crimes as 54.6% of the
total state prison population).
4 See LANGAN & DAWSON, supra note 30, at 5.
' Those crimes that are categorized as violent crimes-namely murder, rape,
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B. Statistical Significance
As evidenced by the national statistics mentioned above, the
number of convicted felons is much higher for blacks in proportion
to their general and, most importantly, voting-age populational
representation. Thus, a 47% convicted black felon rate in 1990
has quite a significant impact on a 4% black voting age popula-
tion45 and an even more profound impact on the estimated
5,842,000 blacks registered to vote in that year 6  From these
figures alone, it can be concluded that statutes disenfranchising
felons effectively eliminate a large number of potential black voters.
Ignoring the specific state figures for a moment, the 389,792 black
convicted felons in 199047 when released hypothetically would lose
voting privileges if the states in which they reside enforced such a
disenfranchisement provision. 4 That number represents addition-
al black voters who, absent such statutes, would enlarge the black
voting age population of 9,171,000, 41 thereby strengthening black
robbery, and assault-are also the crimes that disenfranchising statutes usually target.
See id. at 1 (defining "violent crimes"); supra note 6 (detailing crimes targeted by
disenfranchising statutes).
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
"See supra note 28 and accompanying text. This impact is particularly relevant,
given that 90% of the total felons arrested were of voting age. See supra text
accompanying note 37.
"See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Black registration figures are
important because they represent numbers that would potentially increase if black
felons were allowed to vote. While there is no available data on the number of felons
who are registered or who actually vote in states without disenfranchisement statutes,
the key issue here is opportunity to vote. Hence, black felons should at least be given
the opportunity to enlarge the black voting age population and be included among
the ranks of registered black voters.
"' This figure is derived from the 47% of 829,344 total convicted felons. Seesupra
notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
48It is worth noting that six of the ten states with the largest black populations in
1990 also happen to be states that still disenfranchise ex-felons. See NATIONAL URBAN
LEAGUE, INc.,supra note 25, at 314 (listing the top 10 states which include Mississippi,
Alabama, Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, and Tennessee); Note, supra note 6, at 1300
n.1 (listing those states that disenfranchise ex-felons for life). Within these individual
states, however, blacks are still outnumbered by whites, as they are in all 50 states.
See 1990 CENSUS, supra note 24, at 59.
"' See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. The black voting age population
is estimated based on registration figures from which felons who cannot vote, either
by statute or because they are imprisoned, are presumably excluded. See HORTON &
SMITH, supra note 26, at 480.
One might argue that other measures, such as increased voter registration drives,
would help to lessen the impact on the black vote. Generally, however, registration
drives have had very limited success in increasing the number of registered black
voters. See AnkurJ. Goel et al., Comment, Black Neighborhoods Becoming Black Cities:
1994] 1153
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voting power. Although this data showing impact cannot alone
establish vote dilution,50 such lost voter potential deserves greater
recognition by courts in assessing vote dilution claims, especially
considering the already small number of eligible black voters
nationwide.
Of further significance are the statistics for those six states listed
in Table 1 that still disenfranchise felons. Because the number of
blacks imprisoned in those states is severely disproportionate to the
number of whites imprisoned, and given the comparatively lower
total black population and even smaller black voting age popula-
tion5 1 in those states, felon disenfranchisement laws disproportion-
ately impact the black vote to a significant degree. For example, in
Florida, the state in Table 1 in which the racial disparity is great-
est,5 2 the felon disenfranchisement law potentially affects some
25,385 black prisoners53 as opposed to 18,206 white prisoners.
Derivatively, this law disproportionately impacts the voting power
of the 1,734,149 nonimprisoned blacks who, simply by virtue of
being significantly fewer in number, already have less voting power
than their 10,731,079 white counterparts. Furthermore, the larger
number of blacks imprisoned in that state represent potential voters
that without felon disenfranchisement would strengthen the voting
power of the smaller number of blacks.
Such evidence of severe disproportionate impact should not only
initially prompt judicial vote dilution analysis in cases brought
within those six states and elsewhere,54 but should also be weighed
Group Empowermen Local Control and the Implications of Being Darker than Brown, 23
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 443 (1988) (noting that while voter registration drives
"have brought about growing minority representation in government, voter apathy
among blacks remains overwhelming"). Furthermore, the solution of voter
registration drives does not address the fact that felon disenfranchisement laws still
impact the black vote and may violate the Voting Rights Act.
o See supra notes 19, 23 and accompanying text.
As previously stated, if the black voting age population is smaller than the total
black population nationwide, this should logically hold true for individual states as
well.
52 The racial disparity cited here focuses on the smaller total black population in
relation to white population, as compared to the significantly larger number of blacks
imprisoned than whites.
" Again, while not all of these black prisoners may have committed crimes that
will cost them their right to vote, statistics show that a large portion of them probably
have done so. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. It is also safe to assume
that most of them are of voting age. See supra text accompanying note 37.
Again, these six states are used only as an example. See supra note 39. Severe
disproportionate impact could also be shown in a state such as Kentucky. Obviously,
in that state, disenfranchising a potential 2741 black prisoners has a far greater
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in the analysis to show that blacks in those states have "less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process."
55
Numbers such as those discussed above are quite revealing but
are of very little persuasiveness if one considers criminal justice to
be administered in a fair, proportionate manner with respect to
race. Indeed, one could argue that the criminal justice system treats
blacks and whites alike, and therefore, the disproportionate number
of black felons and prisoners (both nationally and in many states)
is not necessarily the result of systematic discrimination. However,
evidence shows that this is not always the case, and in order to fully
realize the relevance of the statistical data mentioned above, it is
necessary to examine the underlying factors that may account for
such disproportionately large numbers-namely, the disparate
targeting and treatment of blacks by the criminal justice system.
This evidence of disparate targeting and treatment should accompa-
ny statistical data in vote dilution analysis to show that felon
disenfranchisement inflicts a "double-whammy" against black felons
who may be singled out by the criminal justice system from the
start.
1. Disparate Targeting
According to the 1990 Federal Bureau of Investigation's Unform
Crime Report for the United States,5" approximately 3,224,060, or
29%, of 11,151,368 total people arrested were black.57  Of the
9,412,688 persons arrested who were of voting age (eighteen or
older), 2,768,896, or 29.4%, were black. Furthermore, authorities
estimate that the number of black arrests is only likely to increase
in the future. 9 This discouraging data on black arrests may be
impact on the votingpower of the 260,166 nonimprisoned black population than the
impact on 3,385,552 whites by the disenfranchisement of some 6280 white prisoners.
See 1990 CENSUS, supra note 24, at 59; BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 40,
at 83. Because the census includes state prisoners, nonimprisoned population figures
were arrived at by subtracting the number of prisoners from total statewide
population for each racial group. See supra note 24.
55 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). This language, which essentially defines vote
dilution, is borrowed from the Voting Rights Act "totality of circumstances" analysis
which is discussed in depth in Part III. See infra text accompanying note 196
(detailing the "totality of the circumstances" test).
5 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1990).
57 See id. at 192.
58 See id. at 194.
9 See William H. Inman. ustice Svstem Accused of Anti-Black Bias. L.A. TIMFSq. Aim.
11551994]
1156 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:1145
largely attributable to disparate targeting of blacks by the criminal
justice system.
Nowhere is evidence of the criminal justice system's targeting of
minorities stronger than in the so-called "war on drugs," which in
the words of one authority, is essentially "a war on minorities.""0
In 1990, drug traffickers and possessors accounted for 33% of all
convicted felons,6 1 with blacks representing 56% of that group.
2
According to one 1989 report, although blacks represent 41% of all
drug arrests, they account for only 15% of the drug-using popula-
tion."3 A more recent study found that although roughly nine
million Americans are illegal drug users, black and Hispanic drug
users combined represent just one-third of that number, or 3.1 mil-
lion." While some law enforcement officials attribute the discrep-
ancy to the fact that dealers, not users, are the subject of anti-drug
efforts, FBI statistics show that two-thirds of the arrests on drug
charges in 1991 were for possession, not sales.65 As one commen-
tator put it, "'[t]he so-called war on drugs ... is racially biased on
all fronts and has made young black men its enemy and the entire
African American community its victim.'"
66
Philadelphia's "drug czar" John Wilder even admits that "a
black runs a much higher risk of getting stopped and frisked for
drugs ... than a white does in a white community."67  Some
believe that the conscious targeting of blacks is the "easiest and
14, 1988, pt. 1, at 2, 34 (noting evidence that "[i]n cities with 250,000 or more people,
half of all black men will be jailed by age 55 for murder, rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary, larceny, arson or auto theft-offenses the FBI's Uniform Crime
Report classifies as the most serious").
6 David Zucchino, Racial Imbalance Seen in War on Drugs: Blacks and Hispanics Are
Often Targeted for Arres, Yet Three Times as Many Whites Are Users, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Nov. 1, 1992, at Al, A5 (quoting Kennington Wall of the Drug Policy Foundation).
61 See LANGAN & DAwSON, supra note 30, at 1.
62 See id. at 5.
63 See Ruth Marcus, Racial Bias Widely Seen in Criminal Justice System: Research
Often Supports Black Perceptions, WASH. POST, May 12, 1992, at A4 (citing a 1989 USA
Today study).
" See Zucchino, supra note 60, at Al (citing U.S. Justice Department statistics).
In Philadelphia alone, 93% of those arrested on drug charges in 1990 were minorities,
although 46% of people admitted to Philadelphia hospitals for drug-related disorders
were white. See id. at A15. Nationwide, whites represented 61% of drug overdose
victims. See id. Similar disparities also exist in New York City and Baltimore, where
92% and 85%, respectively, of all drug arrests are of blacks or Hispanics. See id.
"See id. at Al.
"Id. at Al, A15 (alteration in original) (quoting a report by the National Center
on Institutions and Alternatives).6
7 Id. at A15.
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most expedient way" to respond to the "'political pressure in this
country to make drug arrests.'"8 According to critics, disruptive
drug raids are more easily accomplished in inner-city neighborhoods
where residents have relatively little political or economic power.
6 9
Comparatively, drug sweeps are less likely to be attempted in white
suburban communities. 71 Yet another form of conscious targeting
is "reverse sting" drug operations, which in Minneapolis netted
some forty-eight black individuals compared to a total of five
whites.
71
Evidence of disparate targeting, such as that indicated by the
war on drugs example, should be weighed with statistical data
showing large numbers of black arrests and convictions to help
explain possible reasons 2 for the perpetuation of the disproportio-
nately higher number of black felons. It could then be argued that
felon disenfranchisement only aggravates this disparate targeting by
further punishing an individual who has been the discriminatory
focus of the criminal justice system.
2. Disparate Treatment
Related to the problem of disparate targeting of blacks is their
unequal treatment by the criminal justice system once such targeting
has made a successful catch. Disparate treatment may be responsi-
ble for the higher number of blacks imprisoned nationwide and in
many states, such as the six states listed in Table 1.7' Felon
disenfranchisement enhances the effects of such discrimination.
' Id. (quoting Clarence Lusane, author of the book Pipe Dream Blues: Racism and
the War on Drugs).69 See id. (acknowledging, however, "that law-abiding inner-city minorities often
scream the loudest for police to act").
7' See id. (quoting Deborah Leavy, executive director of Pennsylvania's American
Civil Liberties Union).
" See Jill Hodges, 87% in "Reverse Sting" Arrests Are Black, STAR TRIB. (St. Paul),
Sept. 11, 1990, at 4B. A reverse sting occurs when a plainclothes police officer lures
a drug buyer into a sale and then arrests that person. See id. A civil suit was filed by
the Hennepin County public defender's office seeking to enjoin the police
department from exercising these reverse stings; no ruling was made as of the time
of Hodges's article. See id.
' Although I am not suggesting that evidence of disparate targeting is solely
responsible for overall disproportionate statistics, it may have significant influence on
the disproportionate black conviction and arrest figures and should factor into
judicial analysis of statistical evidence. See infra part III.C (discussing other factors
that should figure intojudicial analysis under the "totality of circumstances" test).
" See supra text accompanying note 40.
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In 1988, adult black males outnumbered white males in U.S.
prisons 216,000 to 196,000.14 A recent survey showed that 89% of
blacks and 43% of whites believe that blacks do not receive equal
treatment in the criminal justice system.75  Statistics tend to
support these perceptions.
For instance, a study by the RAND Corporation revealed that
44% of black convicted felons are sent to prison, compared to 33%
of convicted white felons.7 6  An earlier three-state study by the
same group found that "Blacks and Hispanics are sentenced to
prison more often and serve longer terms than whites convicted of
similar crimes."77 Another 1992 study by the Federal Judicial
Center found that federal sentences for drug trafficking and
firearms offenses were 49% higher for blacks than for whites in
1990, compared to 28% higher in 1984.78 Also, among the fifteen
states with the highest rates of imprisonment, eleven are in the
South and have large minority populations. 79  As one authority
noted, "[t]he higher incarceration rates may be seen... as a way to
discipline the lower classes, minority classes."
8 0
Furthermore, a 1991 investigation of some 700,000 criminal
cases revealed that whites are more successful than minorities "at
virtually every stage of pretrial negotiation."" According to the
researchers, of the 71,000 adults with no prior felony arrests, "one-
third of whites had the charges reduced, compared to one-fourth of
74 See Inman, supra note 59, at 2 (citing a report by the American Correctional
Association).
' See Marcus, supra note 63, at A4 (citing a Washington Post-ABC News poll
conducted after the first Rodney King verdict).
76 See David Tuller, Prison Term Study Finds No Race Link, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 16,
1990, at A2. Although this study concluded that race was not a factor in sentencing
decisions, civil rights groups have strongly criticized the study for ignoring evidence
that blacks receive the death penalty more often than whites and are arrested and
prosecuted more often. See id.
"Jail More LikelyforMinorities, a Study Shows, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 30, 1983, at
D4 (citing a 1983 RAND Corporation study examining the criminal justice systems of
California, Texas, and Michigan).
78 See Marcus, supra note 63, at A4.
See Inman, supra note 59, at 34. Not surprisingly, six of the 15 states that
disenfranchise felons also happen to be in the South. See supra note 6 (listing the 15
states).
' Inman, supra note 59, at 34 (quoting Maryland criminologist Ray Paternoster).
This fact is of particular significance in constitutional challenges to ex-felon disenfran-
chising statutes, especially where black felons are concerned. See infra part II.A.2
(discussing the significance of black status in constitutional analysis).
s Marcus, supra note 63, at A4 (citing a San Jose Mercury News investigation).
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blacks and Hispanics."'2 Moreover, in Florida cases involving
nonfelonies, blacks accused of killing whites were found to be "twice
as likely as whites accused of killing whites to have their cases
upgraded to felony homicides."'3
Such evidence of the criminal justice system's disparate
treatment of blacks, like evidence of disparate targeting, should be
considered along with raw data showing the disproportionate
number of black criminals. This analysis will provide some
enlightenment as to how the numbers became so skewed in the first
place. Judging from the evidence mentioned above, the higher
number of blacks arrested, convicted of felonies, and imprisoned
can be attributed in large measure to discrimination by the criminal
justice system.8 4 After such discrimination removes more blacks
from society than whites, disenfranchisement serves to remove them
from the ranks of black voters, the numbers of which are already
comparatively lower than whites. For this reason alone, statistics
should play a more significant role in judicial evaluation of ex-felon
disenfranchising statutes where such laws are alleged to unlawfully
dilute the black vote.
II. GENERAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST EX-FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF BLACK STATUS
Some authorities have written about the evils inherent in a
state's disenfranchisement of ex-felons without reference to racial
impact. In addition to statistical evidence, general arguments a-
gainst felon disenfranchisement should play a persuasive role injud-
icial evaluation of black vote dilution claims, particularly when these
arguments are applied to the special case of black ex-felons
8 5
82Id.
Study Sees Disparity injustice, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 15, 1985, at 1B (citing a study
by University of Florida sociologist Michael Radelet); see also Marcus, supra note 63,
at A4 (citing research by University of North Florida psychologist Linda Foley that
shows blacks receive longer sentences when the victim is white). Florida also happens
to be one of the six disenfranchising states previously mentioned where the number
of black prisoners greatly outnumbers white prisoners. See supra text accompanying
notes 40, 52-53.
' The skewed statistics might also be attributed to environmental conditions. See
infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
' Obviously, a court cannot base its decision solely on these arguments. However,
courts have in the past given great deference to broad-based persuasive arguments.
See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) (relying largely on
social policy arguments emphasizing the importance of education in society to
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Generally, the two types of arguments against felon disenfranchise-
ment can be classified as either constitutional or social policy/
theory oriented, although there is considerable overlap.
A. Constitutional Arguments
1. General Arguments: Strict Scrutiny Analysis of
Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement
As one authority has observed, "the only type of legislative
prohibition of the suffrage on a class of persons that has withstood
an equal protection challenge has been the restriction of voting
rights of ex-felons."86 Ex-felon disenfranchisement has come under
attack from a number of authorities who condemn it as an "anachro-
nism"87 that has "its origin in the fogs and fictions of feudal
jurisprudence and doubiess[ly] has been brought forward into
modern statutes without fully realizing either the effect of its literal
significance or the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our
system of government."8 8  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's
ruling in Richardson v. Ramirez8 9 firmly reinforced states' authority
to exclude ex-felons from the franchise by interpreting § 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment as an "affirmative sanction" of such
exclusion." In Wesley, the district court followed Richardson in
overturn the doctrine of "separate but equal" in school segregation cases).
' Adam H. Kurland, Partisan Rhetoric Constitutional Reality, and Political
Responsibility: The Troubling Constitutional Consequences of Achieving D.C. Statehood by
Simple Legislation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 475, 499 (1992) (examining congressional
ability to repeal a statute establishing the District of Columbia's electoral colleges).
17 Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 7, at 757 (noting that disenfranchisement runs
afoul of the "rehabilitative goal of modern criminal justice" and the Fourteenth
Amendment).
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 85-86 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 139 P. 948, 949 (Okla. 1914)).
89 Id. The felon plaintiffs in Richardson argued that the disenfranchisement law
violated the Equal Protection Clause by disenfranchising a class ofindividuals-namely
ex-felons. See id. at 33.
'See id. at 54 (stating that "the exclusion of felons from the vote has an
affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part:
[W]hen the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in
Congress, the Executive andJudicial officers of a State, or the members of
the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State ... or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
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upholding Tennessee's right to disenfranchise ex-felonsf' The
premise of the Richardson decision, however, has come under fire
from a number of authorities, the most notable of which is Justice
Marshall who, in his dissenting opinion, attacked the Court's
interpretation of § 2.92
Specifically, Justice Marshall contended that § 2 was not created
to affirmatively remove felons from equal protection coverage, but
instead was designed to provide the special remedy of reduced
representation to cure the disenfranchisement of blacks. 93  As
Marshall explained, simply "because Congress chose to exempt one
form of electoral discrimination from the reduction-of-representa-
tion remedy provided by Section 2 does not necessarily imply
congressional approval of this disenfranchisement." 4 Even before
Richardson, author Gary Reback foreshadowed Justice Marshall's
sentiments in arguing that "[r]ather than specifically permitting a
state to disenfranchise ex-felons, section two merely indicates that
if a state chose to disenfranchise ex-felons, it would not be penalized
[by a reduction in representation] under section two." 95
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). Essentially, the Richardson Court
reasoned that the foregoing language clearly demonstrated the "understanding of
those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment" that felons were not to be afforded
coverage under the Equal Protection Clause. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54; see also infra
note 113 and accompanying text (noting that the Richardson Court felt this language
"mean[s] what it says").
" See Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 806 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) ("A state may
constitutionally exclude some or all 'convicted felons from the franchise .... '"
(quotingRichardson, 418 U.S. at 53)), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986). In addition
to vote dilution claims, the plaintiff in Wesley argued that the "Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require[d] Tennessee to demonstrate a
compelling state interest justifying the disenfranchisement of felons since the
classification impacts on the fundamental right to vote." Id. at 804.
1 SeeRichardson, 418 U.S. at 74 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (noting that "§ 2 was not
intended and should not be construed to be a limitation on the other sections of the
Fourteenth Amendment").
9 See id. The emphasis on the protection of blacks' voting rights in the history
of § 2 is of particular relevance in cases involving black felons and will be explored
in more detail in the following Section of this Comment. See infra notes 113-14 and
accompanying text.
' Richardson, 418 U.S. at 75-76; see also William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth
Amendmen the 'Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965
Sup. Cr. REv. 33, 65 ("[It seems quite impossible to conclude that there was a clear
and deliberate understanding in the House that Section 2... expressly recognized
the states' power to deny or abridge the right to vote.").
's Reback, supra note 7, at 851.
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Thus, according to Justice Marshall and Reback, § 2 should not
be read to affirmatively exclude felons from equal protection
coverage. 6  Because voting is a fundamental right, ex-felon
disenfranchisement should bejudged according to Equal Protection
strict scrutiny standards, which would require states to demonstrate
a compelling interest to justify such disenfranchisement. 7 Accord-
ing to Justice Marshall and Reback, states cannot meet these
standards.
Essentially, Justice Marshall and Reback argued that the three
findings necessary to demonstrate a compelling state interest under
strict scrutiny-namely, that "the state interest served is compelling,
that the means employed to achieve the state's goals are appropri-
ately narrow, and that the state's purposes cannot be achieved by an
alternative method"9 --cannot be shown to justify ex-felon disen-
franchisement.
The compelling state interest typically advanced in support of
felon disenfranchisement has been termed the "purity of the ballot
box" rationale, or a state's interest "'in preserving the integrity of
' In addition to Reback and Justice Marshall, Justice Rehnquist made a similar
argument. See David L. Shapiro, Mr.Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 293, 303 (1976) ("[T]here is not a word in the fourteenth amendment
suggesting that the exemptions in section two's formula are in any way a barrier to
the judicial application of section one in voting rights cases, whether or not they
involve the rights of ex-convicts.").
"' See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 77 ("[D]isenfranchisement of ex-felons must be
measured against the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause .... "); Reback,
supra note 7, at 852 (arguing that the strict scrutiny test is the appropriate test in
adjudicating felon disenfranchisement cases). Both Reback and Marshall, as well as
the California Supreme Court in Richardson's predecessor, Ramirez v. Brown, 507
P.2d 1345 (1973), point to a number of cases evidencing the developmental
application of the strict scrutiny standard to voting rights cases. See Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (curtailing Tennessee's voter residency
requirements and holding that if a state selectively restricts the right to vote of some
citizens, "'the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote
a compelling state interest'" (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621,
627 (1969))); Kramer, 395 U.S. at 633 (utilizing strict scrutiny to strike down a New
York statute allowing only certain voters to participate in school district elections);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (rendering poll taxes
unconstitutional under the holding that "classifications which might invade or restrain
[fundamental rights] must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined"); Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965) (finding that although a state could impose
"reasonable residence restrictions," it could not deny a resident ballot access simply
because he was a member of the armed forces); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-
62 (1964) (noting that any infringement on the right to vote was to be scrutinized
"carefully and meticulously"). But see Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54 (distinguishing felon
disenfranchisement from other types of state voting qualifications).
" Reback, supra note 7, at 854 (footnotes omitted).
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[its] electoral process by removing from the process those persons
with proven anti-social behavior whose behavior can be said to be
destructive of society's aims.' 99 However, such a moral competen-
cy argument has an exclusionary tendency that has been associated
with the historical "exclusion of blacks, women, and the poor from
the political process."'0 0 The "argument that ex-felons should be
disenfranchised because they have shown themselves lacking in
virtue fits easily within this exclusionary tradition,"' 0 ' especially in
the case of black ex-felons. Furthermore, it is unclear why convicted
felons are any less capable of making sound political decisions than
anyone else. 02 In any event, Reback points out that a state's
interest in protecting society from a felon's allegedly counter-social
choices cannot constitute the compelling interest required for strict
scrutiny, since it is well established that "a state cannot 'fence out'
a group from the political process because it is concerned about the
way [it] may cast [its] ballots.
" 10
3
Similarly, the disenfranchisement of ex-felons to prevent election
fraud, another popular state-interest justification, is not sufficiently
narrow to meet the second element of the strict scrutiny standard.
According to Reback, such disenfranchisement is a blanket
exclusion based on the conclusory presumption that ex-felons, by
virtue of their criminal record, are more likely to commit election
fraud.1'0 As Justice Marshall explained, in terms of election fraud,
typical disenfranchisement provisions are overinclusive in that they
generally are "not limited to those who have demonstrated a marked
propensity for abusing the ballot by violating election laws." 105
Instead, they usually encompass all former felons, even though
" Note, supra note 6, at 1308 (quoting Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73




2 See Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721, 731 (1991) ("No one has put forward a convincing reason
explaining why [felons] cannot make political decisions just as well or as badly as the
rest of us can."); Reback, supra note 7, at 854 n.72 ("It is difficult to see how a felony
conviction reflects on the ability of the ex-felon to participate intelligently in the
electoral process.").
103 Reback, supra note 7, at 854 (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95 (1965)).
'o' See id. at 855 (stating that the exclusion is an overly broad voter classification
that fails the strict scrutiny test).
105 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 79 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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"there has been no showing that ex-felons generally are any more
likely to abuse the ballot than the remainder of the population."
10 6
Finally, states cannot satisfy the third element of strict scrutiny
by showing that there are no less drastic, alternative means to
prevent election fraud than disenfranchisement of felons, since all
states have enumerated penalties for election crimes. 107 As Justice
Marshall noted, California "has at its disposal a variety of criminal
laws that are more than adequate to detect and deter whatever fraud
may be feared,"0 ' and such laws are "far less burdensome on the
constitutionally protected right to vote."" 9  Thus, if ex-felon
disenfranchising statutes were to be judged under equal protection
strict scrutiny standards, "[i]t is highly doubtful that [a] state could
show a compelling interest ... [in] using criminal conviction at all
as a basis for withholding the franchise.""
0
While Marshall's and Reback's general arguments struggle to
justify ex-felons' equal protection coverage (by asserting that § 2 did
not necessarily remove them from such coverage), their analyses fail
to take account of the special case of black felons who, simply by
virtue of their racial status, could assert discrimination claims under
the Equal Protection Clause."' However, in equal protection
challenges where racial discrimination is alleged, plaintiffs must first
show discriminatory purpose or intent."' The following Section
addresses the problems associated with this standard, particularly




"07 See Reback, supra note 7, at 855-56 (noting that "ex-felons who commit election
fraud can be prosecuted under these laws without infringing upon the rights of other
ex-felons").
'" 8Richardson, 418 U.S. at 80 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 353
(1972)).
10 Id.
11 Ferguson v. Williams, 330 F. Supp. 1012, 1022 (N.D. Miss. 1971), vacated, 405
U.S. 1036 (1972).
" Although all U.S. citizens are obviously covered by the Equal Protection Clause
regardless of race, black felons could bring Equal Protection challenges to
disenfranchising laws by claiming that the laws were racially discriminatory even
though facially neutral. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 225 (1985) (holding
that a state constitutional provision, although racially neutral on its face, still violated
the Equal Protection Clause). However, this would require a showing of discriminato-
ry intent which, as this Comment will address, may be especially difficult to establish
in cases of ex-felon disenfranchisement. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
"2 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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2. The Significance of Black Status:
Hunter and the Intent Standard
Through an extensive examination of the legislative history of
§ 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Richardson Court concluded
that Congress had intended to exclude ex-felons from equal
protection coverage."' However, as the Richardson Court ob-
served and Justice Marshall emphasized in his dissent, the primary
goal of § 2 was to remedy the disenfranchisement of blacks by
reducing the representation of any state that denied them the right
to vote.11 4 Congressional concern for protecting blacks' right to
vote through the passage of § 2 is thus contradicted by felon
disenfranchisement statutes which adversely affect the black vote.
Accordingly, it is not clear that even if Congress intended to remove
felons from equal protection coverage, it also would have desired
the result of removing black felons from that coverage, since black
felon disenfranchisement leads to the very same reduction in
representation that Congress sought to remedy by passing § 2.
Furthermore, as the Richardson Court observed, every state
readmitted to the Union after the Civil War via a congressional
enabling act was required to submit for Congress's approval its
proposed state constitution."5 The act admitting Arkansas, the
first state so admitted, conditioned the state's admission on the
inclusion of constitutional language permitting felon disenfranchise-
ment only "under laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants" of
Arkansas.'1 6 In conditioning Arkansas's admission, Congress was
primarily concerned that without such restriction, the state "might
misuse the exception for felons to disenfranchise Negroes.""
l7
"s See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 43-54. The Court specifically focused on the phrase
"except for participation in rebellion, or other crime" in § 2 and concluded that
"legislative history... indicates that this language was intended by Congress to mean
what it says." Id. at 43.
.. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that § 2 "put
Southern States to a choice-enfranchise Negro voters or lose congressional
representation"); see also Foner, supra note 3, at 61 ("The [Fourteenth] amendment
... threatened to reduce Southern representation in Congress if blacks continued to
be denied the franchise."); Reback, supra note 7, at 851 (stating that "Section two was
intended to be an extra penalty" to secure former slaves' right to vote). Although § 2
was primarily aimed at Southern states, its coverage obviously extends to all states.
.. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 48-49.
16 Id. at 52.
1
17 Id. (noting Missouri Senator Drake's observation that "[ilt is a very easy thing
in a State to make one set of laws applicable to white men, and another set of laws
applicable to colored men").
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Thus, Congress recognized at an early stage the danger that criminal
disenfranchisement statutes posed to the black vote.
The reality of such danger was ultimately revealed in Hunter v.
Underwood,' in which the Supreme Court struck down an Ala-
bama constitutional provision that violated the Equal Protection
Clause by disenfranchising persons convicted of "moral turpitude"
crimes. The Court found that the original enactment of the statute
had been motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks and
disenfranchise them. 1 9  Specifically, the Court found that al-
though the disenfranchising provision was facially neutral, the "zeal
for white supremacy [had run] rampant"2 ' when it was adopted
at the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901, and that the
crimes selected for inclusion in the provision were those believed by
the adopters to be most frequently committed by blacks.121 In
addition, the Court found that by 1903, the provision had achieved
its intended result in disenfranchising approximately ten times as
many blacks as whites. 2 2  The Court noted that such disparate
effects continued to exist, with blacks being at least 1.7 times as
likely as whites to be disenfranchised under the provision.
23
Hence, the Hunter Court found both the racially discriminatory
intent, as well as disproportionate impact, necessary to show a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
124
18 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
See id. (holding that the desire to discriminate against blacks violated equal
protection). Only that portion of the provision involving moral turpitude crimes not
punishable by imprisonment was declared invalid, and Alabama continues to
disenfranchise felons convicted of other crimes. See supra note 6 (listing the states
that currently disenfranchise felons).
120 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229. The Court noted the opening address by convention
presidentJohn B. Knox, in which he stated, "And what is it that we want to do? Why
it is within the limits imposed by the Federal Constitution, to establish white
supremacy in this State." Id. The court also relied on the testimony of two expert
historians who verified that "the aim of the 1901 Constitution Convention was to
prevent the resurgence of Populism by disenfranchising practically all... blacks," and
that throughout the debates, the delegates stated that they were primarily interested
in disenfranchising blacks, not whites. Id. at 230-31.
1' See id. at 226-27 (observing that "[v]arious minor nonfelony offenses such as
presenting a worthless check and petty larceny fall within the sweep of § 182, while
more serious nonfelony offenses ... do not because they are [not] ... considered
crimes involving moral turpitude"). The Court adopted the finding of the court of
appeals that "the crimes selected for inclusion ... were believed by the delegates to
be more frequently committed by blacks." Id. at 227.
122 See id.
" See id. (finding that such a disproportionate impact existed in Jefferson and
Montgomery counties).
124 See id. at 227-28 ("Official action will not be held unconstitutional solely
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In constitutional challenges to ex-felon disenfranchising statutes,
intent to discriminate against blacks may arguably be inferred from
statistics such as those presented in Part .125 Accordingly, it
could be argued that due to the disproportionately higher number
of black felons 26 and the disparate targeting of blacks particularly
for drug crimes, 127 constitutional provisions which disenfranchise
ex-felons may have been enacted with the understanding that more
blacks than whites would lose voting rights. However, this argument
is tenuous, and blatant discriminatory intent to disenfranchise
blacks such as that found in Hunter may not be as easily shown in
felon disenfranchisement cases. 2  Indeed, "the idea that all
conduct is benign, except that which is consciously intended to
harm, contradicts much of what we know of the dynamics of
prejudice and discrimination." 129  For this reason, the intent
standard necessary to bring equal protection challenges to felon
disenfranchising statutes should be broadened, particularly where
racially discriminatory intent, though not readily apparent, is a
definite possibility.
As Judge Clark asserted in his dissenting opinion in MCleskey v.
Kemp,' "[t]he intent test is not a monolithic structure. As with
all legal tests, its focus will vary with the legal context in which it is
because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.... Proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause." (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977))).
" See supra parts I.A-B (discussing the statistical data on black felons and how
disenfranchising statutes impact the black voting population).126 Seesupra notes 31,34 and accompanying text (stating that blacks comprise 47%
of convicted felons but only 12.1% of the population).
11 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (stating that blacks make up 41%
of drug arrests but only 15% of drug users).
12 Indeed, the difficulty of showing discriminatory intent was Congress's main
concern in adopting the results test under the Voting Rights Act. See supra notes 9
& 14; infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text. Although this Comment proposes
a different approach under the constitutional intent standard, its primary focus is on
the impact of felon disenfranchising statutes and the applicability of the Voting Rights
Act, since black vote dilution challenges to felon disenfranchising statutes are more
easily addressed under the Act. See supra note 14.
1 Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORDHAM L.
REv. 523, 530 (1991).
150 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), affd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In McCleskey, a black
Georgia man convicted of killing a white police officer argued that because a study
done by University of Iowa professor David Baldus found that black-committed white
murders were more likely to result in the death penalty, such "discernible racial
influence on sentencing render[ed] the operation of the Georgia [criminal justice]
system [unconstitutionally] infirm." Id. at 895.
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applied. Because of the variety of situations in which discrimination
can occur, the method of proving intent is the critical focus."''
AsJudge Clark recognized, "[i]ntent may be proven circumstantially
by utilizing a variety of objective factors and can be inferred from
the totality of the relevant facts."8 2 In the case of ex-felon disen-
franchisement, the foremost of these factors are similar to those
cited by Judge Clark as most essential to showing intent: the
presence of historical discrimination and impact8 as evidenced
by statistics such as those presented in Part I of this Comment."4
As the Court in Rogers v. Lodge' s5 asserted:
Evidence of historical discrimination is relevant to drawing an
inference of purposeful discrimination, particularly... where the
evidence shows that discriminatory practices were commonly
utilized, that they were abandoned when enjoined by courts or
made illegal by civil rights legislation, and that they were replaced
by laws and practices which, though neutral on their face, serve to
maintain the status quo.'8 6
1
3
1 Id. at 924 (Clark, J., dissenting in part). In addition, it has been noted that
"although the equal protection clause has been interpreted to encompass only
purposeful discrimination against protected groups, that narrow view is inconsistent
with judicial interpretation of legislation." Perry, supra note 129, at 530 (footnote
omitted). For instance, in daims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, "courts have adopted broader and more sophisticated models of discrimination
than those focused exclusively on conscious discriminatory intent." Id. at 531.
Furthermore, "analysis under other clauses of the Constitution has frequently focused
on impact rather than intent." Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV.
80, 115-16 (1991).
1
32 MCleskey, 753 F.2d at 924 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 492 U.S. 252, 266); see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982)
("[D]iscriminatory intent need not be proved by direct evidence. 'Necessarily, an
invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts .... ' (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976))).
1 3 Specifically, Judge Clark focused on the presence of historical discrimination
and the impact of discriminatory capital sentencing on blacks, as revealed by the
Baldus study. See Mcgleskey, 753 F.2d at 924 (stating that the results of the study,
"coupled with the historical facts, demonstrate a prima fade Fourteenth Amendment
violation").
"s Most important is the impact of 389,792 black convicted felons on a black
voting age population of 9,171,000. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
Disparate targeting and treatment obviously should also factor into the analysis. See
generally supra parts I.B.1-2 (discussing the targeting of blacks in the war on drugs and
the higher conviction rates and longer prison terms for blacks).
135 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
136 1d. at 625.
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Evidence of historical discrimination in a particular state that
removes ex-felons' voting rights could be used to buttress the
argument that a disenfranchising provision was adopted with the
knowledge that a disproportionate number of blacks would be
impacted. In this way, discriminatory intent would not have to be
as readily apparent as in Hunter, but instead could be inferred from
relevant surrounding circumstances.
As previously discussed, the intent standard as it currently exists
may be too difficult for black felons to satisfy."8 7 Therefore, ex-
felon disenfranchisement claims should be brought under the
Voting Rights Act, which has a much easier standard. 8 Never-
theless, constitutional arguments against felon disenfranchisement,
such as those advanced by justice Marshall and Gary Reback, should
play a role in the Voting Rights Act analysis,8 9 as should social
policy/theory arguments which are the subject of the next Section.
B. Social Policy/Theory Arguments
1. General Arguments: The Lockean Social Contract
Theory and Punishment Rationale
In addition to constitutional arguments against ex-felon
disenfranchisement, there exist social policy/theory arguments
condemning the practice. Such arguments are typically used to
counter similarly oriented arguments often advanced by courts to
justify ex-felon disenfranchisement.
140
For instance, in Wesley, the court observed the Lockean social
contract theory historically relied upon by states to justify early
exclusion of felons from the franchise, which holds that "by entering
'
5 7 See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
iSee infra parts IA-B (discussing the history of the Voting Rights Act and its
significance in felon disenfranchisement cases).
139 See infra text accompanying notes 202, 242.
1 See, e.g., Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967) ("[It
can] scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that perpetrators of
serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators who make the laws, the
executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must try them for further
violations, or thejudges who are to consider their cases."); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327
F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) ("A State has an interest in preserving the integrity
of her electoral process by removing from the process those persons with proven anti-
social behavior whose behavior can be said to be destructive of society's aims."). The
Kronlund court's rationale for disenfranchising ex-felons is known as the "purity of the
ballot box." See supra text accompanying note 99.
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into society, every man authorizes the society, or... the legislature
thereof, to make laws for him as the public good of the society shall
require, to the execution whereof his own assistance... is
due."' From this observation, the court reasoned that "a man
who breaks the laws he has authorized his agent to make for his own
governance could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the
right to participate in further administering the compact. " 142 The
Lockean theory, however, has been attacked on several grounds.
For example, it has been asserted that the Lockeanjustification
for felon disenfranchisement "fails to take seriously important
liberal values," specifically the modern liberal belief that "prior to
the social contract, individuals have fundamental rights and liberties
that allow them to bargain freely but that cannot be freely bargained
away."14' According to theorist John Rawls, the first principle of
justice is that "all citizens are to have an equal right to take part in,
and to determine the outcome of, the constitutional process that
establishes the laws with which they are to comply."'" Thus,
"[t]he disenfranchisement of ex-offenders violates this basic tenet of
modern liberalism." 145 Furthermore, the removal of felons' voting
rights violates the Lockean principle that each transgression from
the social contract should be "'punished to that degree, and with so
much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the
offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing
the like. '"146 Accordingly, "[d]isenfranchisement for life fails to
meet this standard [since] permanent exclusion from the political
community is imposed equally on all felons," regardless of the
degree of severity of their crimes.
47
Similarly, social policy activists have condemned the punishment
justification for ex-felon disenfranchisement. As authorities Howard
141 Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802,813 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (quoting Green, 380
F.2d at 451), affd, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).1 Id. at 813 (quoting Green, 380 F.2d at 451).
m Note, supra note 6, at 1306.
'"JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 221 (1971).
145 Note, supra note 6, at 1306.
" Id. at 1306-07 (quotingJOHiN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
AND A LETrER CONCERNING TOLERATION 8 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1976) (3d
ed. 1698)). Also, disenfranchisement does not necessarily "terrify" or deter potential
offenders. See infra text accompanying notes 153-54 (noting the unlikelihood that
disenfranchisement would be a stronger deterrent than a prison sentence).
147 Note, supra note 6, at 1307; see also Reback, supra note 7, at 860 (stating that
disenfranchisement is an excessive penalty that is "proportional in neither severity nor
length to the seriousness of offenses").
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Itzkowitz and Lauren Oldak point out, ex-felon disenfranchisement
cannot satisfy even "one of the four traditionally accepted rationales
for punishment: rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution and
incapacitation." 148  In terms of rehabilitation, the removal of
voting rights negatively impacts any attempt by ex-offenders to
enhance self-esteem, which is essential to the reformative process,
by implying that they are unfit to cast their ballots.'49 It has been
suggested that disenfranchisement may even lead to recidivism.
150
Disenfranchisement also serves to further alienate and isolate ex-
offenders from society by denying them "participation in the most
crucial function of a democratic society" and is thus counterproduc-
tive to rehabilitation's aim of "strengthening the criminal's commu-
nity ties by reinforcing his identification with community values and
the habits of law-abiding citizens."'' Moreover, rehabilitation's
goal of fostering community acceptance of the ex-offender is
undermined by disenfranchisement which "acts to increase social
distance by branding the released criminal with a stigma which
emphasizes ... his difference from 'normal' citizens who retain
their right of suffrage."
5 2
14 Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 7, at 730-31.
149 See id. at 732; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting that no
good reasons have been advanced to explain why an ex-felon cannot make political
decisions as well as any other citizen).
15- See Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 7, at 732 ("The offender finds himself
released from prison, ready to start life anew and yet at election time still subject to
the humiliating implications of disenfranchisement, a fact that may lead to
recidivism."); see also NATIONAL ADvISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS
& GOALS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONS 592 (1973) [hereinafter NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMm'N] ("[The ex-offender's] respect for law and the legal system may
well depend, in some measure, on his ability to participate in that system.").
"' Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 7, at 732; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 111
(1958) ("It is perfectly obvious that [revocation of citizenship] constitutes the very
antithesis of rehabilitation, for instead of guiding the offender back into the useful
paths of society it excommunicates him and makes him, literally, an outcast.");
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 150, at 593 ("Loss of citizenship rights
[including] the right to vote ... inhibits reformative efforts. If corrections is to
reintegrate an offender into free society, the offender must retain all attributes of
citizenship."); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 90 (1967) ("[R]ehabilitation might be furthered
by encouraging convicted persons to participate in society by exercising the vote.");
Reback, supra note 7, at 864 ("[T]he offender's inability to vote may produce a feeling
of estrangement from the [societal] institutions.., that 'foster the development of
law-abiding conduct.'" (quoting Walter M. Grant et al., Special Project, The Collateral
Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1228 (1970))).
112 Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 7, at 733.
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The deterrence rationale also fails to justify disenfranchisement
as punishment, since it is unlikely that the threat of disenfranchise-
ment would deter potential offenders if, as studies show, a lengthy
prison sentence does not. 5 A plausible reason for this failure is
that most potential criminals are ignorant of the particular penalty
associated with specific crimes and are also unaware that disenfran-
chisement accompanies conviction.'54 Furthermore, the goals of
retribution cannot be fulfilled by disenfranchisement because the
use of disenfranchisement as revenge for crime "can only exacerbate
[the] hostility [that] exists between the criminal and society and,
indeed, may lead to further injury to the community."1 5 Nor can
disenfranchisement correct the original crime.'56
Finally, ex-felon disenfranchisement does not satisfy the
concerns that form the basis of the incapacitation rationale, a type
of specific deterrence which, in the case of felons' voting rights, has
also been defined as the "purity of the ballot box" rationale.' As
previously noted, this rationale has been attacked for being overly
exclusionary, 5 ' and it is not clear why felons should be incapaci-
tated from voting when there is no proof that they cannot make
sound political decisions.
15 9
Moreover, it has been asserted that "[a] fixation with what may
be an isolated incident in a person's distant past... fails to further
the goal of measuring a person's virtue in the present."160 By
assuming that an ex-felon is unworthy of exercising the franchise in
a socially acceptable manner simply because of his or her criminal
background, the incapacitation rationale fails to recognize the
disjuncture between an individual's past and present behavior. Even
if one could prove a correlation between past offenses and future
"' See id. at 734 (citing a 1968 study by the California Assembly Committee on
Criminal Procedure showing that "lengthy prison sentences are not effective
deterrents").
"s See id. at 734-35 (stating that because this punishment receives little attention,
it is "likely that the potential offender would not realize that [a] conviction would
result in the loss of the right to vote").
155 Id. at 736.
"6 See id. ("[H]ow can depriving a man of his right to vote, a man who presumably
has paid his debt to society by years of incarceration, restore the money stolen or
expunge the adulterous act?").
... See id. at 737 (noting that judicial opinions have not been clear as to exactly
what evils disenfranchisement would eliminate); see also supra text accompanying note
99 (explaining the "purity of the ballot box" rationale).
'58 See supra text accompanying notes 100-01.
... See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
160 Note, supra note 6, at 1309.
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election crimes, 161 our "criminal justice system is based on the
premise that once a criminal has completed his sentence, society has
the burden of proving guilt of a new crime beyond a reasonable
doubt and does not have the right to punish the ex-criminal in
advance on a basis of probability.
" 162
Thus, arguments advanced to justify felon disenfranchisement,
most notably the Lockean theory and punishment rationale, are
successfully countered by social policy/theory arguments. The
significance of social policy challenges to ex-felon disenfranchise-
ment is further enhanced by the element of black status.
2. The Significance of Black Status: The Heightened Negative
Effects of Disenfranchisement
As one authority states, "Disenfranchisement is a prop in [the]
act of communal self-delusion. By rationalizing and facilitating a
tendency to localize the blame for crime in the individual, disenfran-
chisement helps to obscure the complexity of the roots of crime and
their entanglement with contingent social structures. " 163 Inherent
in these social structures are what author Ramsey Clark describes as
"fountainheads of crime," or more specifically, "slums, racism,
ignorance and violence, . . . corruption and impotence to fulfill
rights,.., poverty and unemployment and idleness,.. . generations
of malnutrition... sickness and disease,. . . pollution,.., decrepit,
dirty, ugly, unsafe, overcrowded housing, ... alcoholism and
narcotics addiction, ... fear, hatred, hopelessness and injus-
tice."' Unfortunately, the victims of such conditions are most
often black. Disenfranchisement of black ex-felons tends to
overlook these environmental conditions that can be held largely
responsible for crime,165 and therefore ignores the fact that a
6 See supra text accompanying notes 105-06 (notingJustice Marshall's view that
disenfranchisement provisions are not restricted to those cases in which such a
correlation has been proven).
162 Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 7, at 739; see also Steven B. Snyder, Let My People
Run: The Rights of Voters and Candidates Under State Laws Barring Felons from Holding
Elective Ofice, 4 J.L. & POL. 543, 566 (1988) ("[P]unishment as a rationale [for
disenfranchisement] is merely conclusory. It begs the question of why [disenfran-
chisement] is necessary as a punishment, especially when the ex-felon has already
served the appropriate prison and parole time."). Snyder's article primarily focuses
on the disqualification of felons from holding elected positions, another type of
restriction imposed upon felons simply by virtue of their criminal record.
'63 Note, supra note 6, at 1311.
164 RAMSEY CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 17 (1970).
65 See Inman, supra note 59, at 2 (stating that "[m]ounting poverty ... , one-
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felon's "conscious decision" to commit a crime, allegedly justifying
disenfranchisement,1 66 may have been influenced by environmen-
tal forces mostly beyond his or her control.
Furthermore, "in conjunction with other degrading disabilities
[such as societal isolation and alienation] often faced by ex-offend-
ers, disenfranchisement stands as a gratuitous impediment to re-
entry into the community."167 In the context of race, the degrad-
ing disability is not the status of being black, but rather it is the
prevalence of discrimination 168 and environmental conditions such
as those previously discussed. Also, the social stigmatization that
disenfranchisement imposes upon ex-felons,'6 9 by implying that
they are unfit to exercise the franchise, 170 is compounded by
society's negative perceptions of black individuals. 7 1 Disenfran-
parent families, teen unemployment and slack education play important roles" in the
high crime rate among inner city blacks). According tojames Eaglin, chairman of the
National Association of Blacks in CriminalJustice, "[i]f you're uncertain where your
next meal is coming from, uncertain if your mom is going to have enough money to
pay back rent, there is a real strong incentive to move into the [criminal] process....
Crime very clearly grows out of opportunity." Id. at 34 (alteration in original); see also
Ernest Van Den Haag, No Excusefor Crime, in CRIME iN SOciETY 205, 205 (Leonard
D. Savitz & NormanJohnston eds., 1978) ("'[I]f the ghetto victim does what for many
such persons is inevitable and is then incarcerated... he is in a real sense a political
prisoner,' because he is punished for the 'inevitable consequences of a certain socio-
political status.'" (quoting S.I. Shuman, Professor of Law and Psychiatry at Wayne
State University)).
"s This was one of the Wesley court's arguments, which obviously failed to take
notice of the environmental influences on crime. See Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp.
802, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) ("Felons are ... disenfranchised based on ... their
conscious decision to commit an act for which they assume the risks of... punish-
ment."), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).167 Note, supra note 6, at 1316 (footnote omitted).
18 For evidence of the continuing prevalence of discrimination, see T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance of Racism, 63 U.
COLO. L. REv. 325, 333 (1992) ("Blacks regularly report poorer service at restaurants
and hotels, and harassment and surveillance while shopping.... Blacks walking or
driving in predominantly white neighborhoods are followed by police, verbally
abused, and physically harassed." (footnote omitted)).
169 See Reback, supra note 7, at 863 ("It makes little sense to stigmatize a felon by
denying him the right to vote .... Civil disabilities which affix an additional stigma
to an ex-felon's already inferior status play a significant role in creating adverse
community attitudes toward ex-felons." (footnote omitted)).
17o Seesupra text accompanying note 149 (noting that this stigma can affect the ex-
felon's self-esteem).
"' See Aleinikoff, supra note 168, at 332 (citing a 1990 survey of 1372 U.S.
households which found that "more than fifty percent of the whites surveyed thought
that blacks were less intelligent, less hard-working, more violence-prone, and less
patriotic than whites").
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chisement only serves to strengthen these false, racist perceptions
of black ex-felons.
Moreover, disenfranchisement hinders rehabilitation efforts by
black felons whose community ties may already be severely
weakened by the prevalence of racial discrimination, thereby
creating a further barrier to their re-entry into the community.
1 72
Where discrimination exists, community acceptance of the black ex-
offender will be reluctant if not nonexistent. He or she may feel
even further removed from society if disenfranchisement accompa-
nies such discrimination.
Indeed, the negative effects of felon disenfranchisement are felt
two-fold by black ex-offenders who may already experience
alienation and isolation in a racist society. For this reason, social
policy/theory arguments, both general and race-focused, condemn-
ing ex-felon disenfranchisement should play an important persuasive
role in judicial review of the impact of felon disenfranchising
statutes on the black vote. Obviously, neither constitutional nor
social policy arguments can show impact directly, but the logic and
force of their premises are essential to claims challenging black ex-
felon disenfranchisement. As the following Section will explore,
such claims are best suited for judicial analysis under the federal
Voting Rights Act.
III. BLACK VOTE DILUTION CHALLENGES TO EX-FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT UNDER THE
FEDERAL VOTING RIGHTS ACT
A. Background: The Voting Rights Act and
§ 2 Amendments
In response to decades of voting discrimination against blacks,
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965,171 which Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson called "a triumph for freedom as huge as
any victory that has ever been won on any battlefield." 74 Prior to
the Act, disenfranchisement for the most part had been a fact of life
for many blacks, whose systematic deprivation of the right to vote
17 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
17' Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988)).
174 ROBERT WEISBROT, FREEDOM BOUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 152 (1990) (quoting Lyndon B.Johnson, Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda
at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act (Aug. 6, 1965), in 1965 PUB. PAPERS 840,840).
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could not be effectively remedied by courts which were unable to
change reality by "merely outlawing specific illegal practices."
175
The Act affirmatively gave blacks the right to vote, thereby "replac-
ing the negative right to be free from discrimination in voting"
176
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The original intent of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 was to "free
minority voters from 'the near-tyranny of nonrepresentation' and to
make state and local government more 'responsive. "177 Subsequent
amendments to the Voting Rights Act, particularly Congress's 1982
amendments to § 2178 which provides the statutory basis for vote
dilution claims, "confirmed that the statutory goal underlying black
empowerment remains 'to help assure adequate representation of
all interests' and 'to gain the influence that [political] participation
brings.
' " 179
In 1982, Congress amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act in
order to emphasize its original intent that "violations of the [Act]
could be established by showing the discriminatory effect of the
challenged practices" at issue."' Accordingly, the amended § 2
prohibits any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure ... which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of
race or color."
1 8 1
Congress's amendment to § 2 came in response to the Supreme
Court's 1980 ruling in City of Mobile v. Bolden. 8 2 The Bolden Court
rejected the "results" standard previously relied upon by courts to
decide minority vote dilution claims.' Instead, the Court re-
quired proof of discriminatory intent for § 2 claims as well as
"1 5 Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The Viewfrom 1989, 64 TUL. L. REv.
1407, 1419 (1990).
178 Id.
'7 Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1413, 1418 (1991) (footnote omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 37, 53 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2466, 2482).
171 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b) (1988).
179 Guinier, supra note 177, at 1418 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting 115 CONG. REC. 5520,5531 (1970) and U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER 8 (1975)).
180 Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 1249, 1265 (1989).
181 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (emphasis added).
182 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
183 The results standard had been used by the Supreme Court in Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims.18 4  Congress,
however, felt that this intent requirement placed "an unacceptably
difficult burden on plaintiffs" by requiring them to prove that local
officials were racist, and that it diverted proper judicial inquiry
"from the crucial question of whether minorities have equal access
to the electoral process to a historical question of individual
motives."'85 In place of this intent standard, Congress reinstituted
the "results" test which required that § 2 plaintiffs need only show
that a "challenged election law or procedure ... had the result of
denying a racial... minority an equal chance to participate in the
electoral process."
186
B. The Significance of the Voting Rights Act in Assessing
Black Vote Dilution Claims Against Ex-Felon
Disenfranchisement
Typically, § 2 claims have been instituted in the context of at-
large elections or legislative districting schemes. 8 7  Prior to
Wesley, § 2 had not been examined in the context of claims of black
vote dilution by ex-felon disenfranchising statutes. 88 However, as
the court concluded in Whitfield v. Democratic Party,'8 9 "section 2
was not meant to apply only to cases challenging at-large election
schemes and districting matters, although it is true that most of the
previous section 2 cases concern these types of discriminatory
voting practices."'
184 See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 69-70.
5 S. REP. No. 417, supra note 9, at 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 193.
Id. Specifically, Congress stated:
In our view, proof of discriminatory purpose should not be a
prerequisite to establishing a violation ofSection 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Therefore, the Committee has amended Section 2 to permit plaintiffs to
prove violations by showing that minority voters were denied an equal
chance to participate in the political process, i.e., by meeting the pr[e]-
Bolden results test.
Id.
1" See Whitfield v. Democratic Party, 890 F.2d 1423, 1427 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating
that "virtually all of the cases decided under section 2 deal with at-large elections or
legislative districting matters"); Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 807 n.4 (M.D.
Tenn. 1985) (stating that "[t]ypically, dilution charged under the Voting Rights Act
appears in the context of reapportionment plans"), afJd, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir.
1986).
"8 See Weslry, 605 F.Supp. at 807 n.4 (noting that "[tihe context of dilution in this
case [of ex-felon disenfranchisement] is unique and has not previously been presented
before a federal court").
189 890 F.2d 1423 (8th Cir. 1989).
" Id. at 1427. The court added that "[n]owhere in the language of the [Voting
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Furthermore, according to the Supreme Court, the purpose of
the Voting Rights Act is "to rid the country of racial discrimination
in voting,"191 and therefore, the Act should be construed as having
"the broadest possible scope." 9 2 Thus, § 2 may be used to bring
vote dilution challenges to ex-felon disenfranchisement.
1 93
The Voting Rights Act is particularly suited for such challenges
given its far less burdensome results test. As previously noted,
intent may be quite difficult to prove in ex-felon disenfranchisement
cases. 194 The Voting Rights Act allows plaintiffs to show the effects
of ex-felon disenfranchising statutes on the black vote without the
need for an extensive, if not potentially fruitless, search for
discriminatory motives. 195 Accordingly, plaintiffs in such cases may
be able to "pass" the results test through the Act's "totality of
circumstances" analysis, which should be appropriately tailored to
the case of ex-felon disenfranchisement.
C. The Totality of Circumstances Analysis of Ex-Felon
Disenfranchisement Vote Dilution Claims
The amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides that vote
dilution in violation of the Act is established if
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by [the Act] in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.
96
Rights Act] did Congress limit the application of section 2 [to cases] involving at-large
elections or redistricting." Id.
... South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).
' Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969).
Although the Wesley court dismissed the plaintiff's § 2 claims for failure to
establish a causal nexus, the court never contended that § 2 did not apply to the case
of ex-felon disenfranchisement. For a discussion of the court's causal nexus fallacy,
see infra part III.C.3. It would follow, then, that such claims may be brought under
§2.
19 See supra text accompanying notes 125-28.
... Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment challenges would still require such a
showing of intent and may thus send plaintiffs on a "fishing expedition for
unspecified evidence." Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1263 (6th Cir. 1986).
Furthermore, "[a] finding of liability under section 2 would obviate the necessity to
decide the plaintiffs' Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims." Lee County
Branch of the NAACP v. City of Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473, 1478 (11th Cir. 1984).
'96 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Congress was careful to include
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Congress identified nine relevant factors to be weighed by
courts in the totality of circumstances analysis.197 While the
assessment of these factors was intended to demonstrate that in the
totality of circumstances, the result of the challenged practice or
structure was to deny plaintiffs equal opportunity to participate in
the electoral process, the factors are "neither exclusive nor
controlling," and the totality of circumstances analysis "requires a
highly individualistic inquiry."198 Furthermore, no particular
number of factors must be proven 99 and "[ito the extent that the
the disclaimer that "nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." Id.
Congress established the following factors to be considered in vote dilution
cases:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority
group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic
process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot
provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the
opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the
minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as
education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or
subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part
of plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are:
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members
of the minority group.
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivi-
sion's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
S. REP. No. 417, supra note 9, at 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07
(footnotes omitted).
11 Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1260. As Congress stated, "[w]hile these enumerated
factors will often be the most relevant ones, in some cases other factors will be
indicative of the alleged dilution." S. REP. No. 417, supra note 9, at 29, reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207.
"9 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986).
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enumerated factors are not factually relevant, they may be replaced
or substituted by other, more meaningful factors."
2
11
In the case of ex-felon disenfranchisement, these "other, more
meaningful factors" should include statistics, such as those present-
ed in Part I of this Comment, showing that the number of black ex-
felons per black voting age population in a given state is dispropor-
tionately high compared to the corresponding numbers for whites.
Evidence of disparate targeting and treatment should accompany
these statistics to demonstrate possible reasons for such num-
bers. 01 In addition, constitutional and social policy arguments
against ex-felon disenfranchisement should be included as persua-
sive evidence to show the tenuousness of a state's underlying policy
reasons for ex-felon disenfranchisement. 2 2  These elements
should supplement Congress's enumerated factors, not replace
them.
In Thornburg v. Gingle, 2° s the first Supreme Court case to
interpret the amended § 2,204 the Court adopted a "'functional'
view of the political process" and isolated "the most important
Senate Report factors bearing on § 2 challenges to multimember
districts"-namely, the electoral success of minority candidates in the
district and the extent of racial bloc voting.215  In § 2 claims
against ex-felon disenfranchisement, the most important factors are
the history of official voting discrimination and the use of districting
schemes and other voting practices and procedures to continue the
effects of such historical discrimination, 2° and the extent to which
the lingering effects of discrimination in socioeconomic areas such
as education, employment, and health thwart effective black
participation in the political process.2" The plaintiff in Wesley
20 Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 350 (E.D. La. 1983) (threejudge court).
.01 See supra parts I.B.1-2 (discussing the significance of statistics related to
disparate targeting and treatment).
202 The tenuousness of underlying state policy is one of the additional factors cited
by the Senate. See supra note 197.
203 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
204 See id. at 34.
2 5 Id. at 48 n.15. Hence, the Court tailored its analysis to multimember district
claims.
20 In essence, the third Senate factor can be regarded as an extension of the
historical voting discrimination described by the first factor. See supra note 197
(listing the Senate factors). Therefore, I am combining them.
2 This is the fifth Senate factor. See supra note 197. I am not suggesting that
these factors are in themselves exclusive and controlling. Other enumerated factors
may be present which are comparatively stronger than my proposed essential factors
and may thus command greater deference. I am proposing that these factors, where
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argued that the combination of these factors with ex-felon disenfran-
chisement impermissibly diluted the black vote,2 8 suggesting that
these factors are most relevant to such claims and should be given
greater emphasis in judicial analysis.
1. Discrimination in Voting
According to one senator:
The importance of the right to vote is recognized by those who
want to participate in the democratic process and by those who
have so bitterly and persistently opposed that participation. Both
sides realize that the vote for any minority means some degree of
significant political power-power that will lead to better lives.209
Although the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments granted
blacks full civil and political rights (at least theoretically), for many,
access to the electoral process was achieved only after decades of
"struggle in the courts, in Congress, and through [the] mass
protests" of the Civil Rights Movement.210 Indeed, prior to
passage of the Voting Rights Act, white-dominated governments,
particularly in the South,211 "had suppressed the minority right to
they are present to a great degree, deserve emphasis in § 2 challenges to ex-felon
disenfranchisement, although not to the exclusion of the other enumerated factors
that may also be present. See Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1413 (9th
Cir. 1988) (noting that the Supreme Court "put substantially greater emphasis on
some of the Senate factors than on others").
'" The Wesley plaintiff argued that the historical repression of blacks in
Tennessee, "marked by limited access to and segregation in the provision of health
care, housing and education, and by sustained efforts to prevent blacks from
registering to vote," would, in combination with the state's ex-felon disenfranchising
statute, "progressively dilute the black vote thereby impeding the equal opportunity
of blacks to participate in the political process." Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802,
804 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), affid, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
20116 CONG. REC. 6642 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Tydings). The remarks of one
woman vividly illustrate the power of the vote:
I was ... told.., that if I registered to vote, I would have food to eat and
a better house to stay in .... My child would have a better education ....
[Voting stood for] the basic needs of the people. The whites, they
understood it even larger than that in terms of political power.
HENRY HAMPTON & STEVE FAYER, VOICES OF FREEpoM: AN ORAL HIsTORY OF THE
CIviL RIGHTs MOvEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE 1980s, at 180 (1990)
(quoting Unita Blackwell, a participant in the voting rights movement that swept the
South during the 1960s).
210 Linda F. Williams, The Constitution and the Civil Rights Movement: The Quest for
a More Perfect Union, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note
3, at 97, 98.
211 Coincidentally, six of the 15 states that still disenfranchise ex-felons for life are
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vote through the use of violence, intimidation, and devices such as
literacy tests, poll taxes, and primaries restricted on the basis of race
and wealth."212 Even after passage of the Act and its 1982 amend-
ments, the discriminatory effects of such devices continued in the
form of "minority vote dilution through sophisticated legal and
administrative barriers such as at-large electoral systems, racial
gerrymandering, unfair candidate slating procedures, and runoff
requirements." 213 In addition, other barriers exist that are beyond
the scope of statutory remedy, such as "psychological barriers" in
the form of a "lack of a habit of voting derived from years of
exclusion from voting, fear, deference to whites, and apathy"
214
and "institutional obstacles" in the form of inadequate voter
registration and procedure information, inconvenient registration
locations and hours, and the "scarcity of black registration officials,
especially in the South."215 It is thus beyond question that signifi-
cant obstacles to effective black electoral participation remain.
216
The impact of these obstacles on the black vote is compounded
by ex-felon disenfranchisment, which may be seen as yet another
barrier to black electoral participation. Accordingly, ex-felon
disenfranchisement, by removing potential voters from an already
low number of eligible black voters, further enhances the dilution
in the South. These states include Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Tennessee, and Virginia. See supra note 6 (listing the 15 states). Furthermore, these
states, with the exception of Tennessee and Kentucky, are also states where, given the
comparatively larger number of blacks imprisoned than whites, ex-felon disenfran-
chisement would have its greatest impact on the black vote. See supra parts IA-B
(citing statistics concerning the racial makeup of felons and voters, and discussing
their significance).
" April D. Dulaney, A Judicial Exception forJudicial Elections: "A Burning Scar on
the Flesh of the VotingRights Ac4"65 TUL. L. REv. 1223, 1223-24 (1991). For examples
of such discrimination, see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(declaring unconstitutional Virginia's poll tax which made voter affluence an electoral
standard); United States v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (invalidating as discrimina-
tory astate constitutional provision requiring avoting applicant to pass a constitution
interpretation test); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that rules of the
Texas Democratic Party excluding blacks from voting in the party's primaries violated
the Fifteenth Amendment).
21' Williams, supra note 210, at 100.214 Id.
215 Id.
216 See id. ("The considerable progress made by blacks in eliminating barriers to
their electoral participation ... has not occurred evenly across all parts of the
process, and substantial barriers remain."); see also Dulaney, supra note 212, at 1258-
59 ("While the Voting Rights Act ... has achieved much progress, racial discrimina-
tion continues to deny racial minorities the opportunity to participate meaningfully
in the political process.").
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and vote-inhibiting effects accompanying those barriers detailed
above.
2. Discrimination in Socioeconomic Areas
Congress has recognized that "disproportionate education[,]
employment, income level and living conditions arising from past
discrimination tend to depress minority political participation."
217
According to Congress, "[w]here these conditions are shown, ....
[Voting Rights Act] plaintiffs need not prove any further causal
nexus between their disparate socio-economic status and the
depressed level of political participation." 218 In United States v.
Marengo County Commission,219 the Eleventh Circuit clearly articu-
lated Congress's intentions in holding that "when there is clear
evidence of present socioeconomic or political disadvantage
resulting from past discrimination," reduced political participation
is inferred. 22' Thus, where discrimination has reduced the socio-
economic status of blacks, their ability to effectively participate in
the franchise is assumed to be hindered.
Indeed, the socioeconomic status of many blacks has been
devastated by discrimination in such areas as employment, educa-
tion, and housing. As recently as 1989, the Eighth Circuit found
evidence that as a result of discrimination in those areas, blacks in
Arkansas "suffer from less education, less employment, lower
income levels, and disparate living conditions as compared to
whites." 221 Despite legislation aimed at its eradication, discrimi-
nation in these areas continues to be prevalent nationwide.
For instance, discrimination in housing continues to be
widespread, with blacks being "more likely to be excluded from
renting or buying in certain residential areas, to be given quotations
of higher prices and rents, and to be 'steered' to areas already
21
7 S. REP. No. 417, supra note 9, at 29 n.114, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
207.
218 Id.
219 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984).
"o Id. at 1569 (citing Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 881-82 (5th Cir. 1979)); see
also United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1529, 1537 (11th Cir. 1984)
(noting that "[ilnequality of access is an inference which flows from the existence of
economic and educational inequalities" (quoting Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554
F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir. 1977))). The Marengo court held that this inference is
rebutted if the defendant shows that some other factor is causing depressed political
participation. See Marengo, 731 F.2d at 1569.
"2 Whitfield v. Democratic Party, 890 F.2d 1423, 1431 (8th Cir. 1989).
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primarily populated by blacks." 222 Employment discrimination also
remains widespread. Blacks continue to be discriminated against in
the hiring process, receiving significantly fewer offers of employ-
ment than their white counterparts. 22 Given the persistence and
pervasiveness of such societal discrimination, its negative effects on
the socioeconomic status of blacks can only be expected to continue
and to adversely affect their political participation.
224
Ex-felon disenfranchisement effectively exacerbates the de-
creased political participation accompanying blacks' lower socioeco-
nomic status. The denial of ex-felons' voting rights further erodes
black participation by removing potential voters who might increase
that participation. In addition, as the plaintiff in Wesley argued,22 5
socioeconomic pressures largely attributable to the forces of
discrimination may account for higher rates of crime among
blacks. 226  Ex-felon disenfranchisement is the crowning blow in
this chain reaction set in motion by racial discrimination. Where
socioeconomic discrimination and voting discrimination factors are
forcefully evident, ex-felon disenfranchisement may be assumed to
work in conjunction with these factors to deny blacks equal
opportunity to participate in the electoral process. As one court
noted, racial vote dilution can be enhanced by cultural, political,
social, and economic factors that relatively disadvantage racial
minorities and "further operate to diminish practical political
effectiveness." 227  The Wesley court incorrectly analyzed these
important factors.
222 A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 50 (Gerald D.Jaynes &
Robin M. Williams,Jr. eds., 1989). In addition, a 1991 study of 25 metropolitan areas
revealed that 56% of black home buyers "experienced some form of unfavorable
treatment, such as being shown different or fewer housing opportunities or offered
less favorable terms or assistance than comparable white home buyers." Aleinikoff,
supra note 168, at 336 (citing MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: SYNTHESIS vi (1991)).
See MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES
DIMINISHED: DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING 31 (1991) ("[The] unequal treatment of black
jobseekers is entrenched and widespread.").
22 See supra note 216 and accompanying text (noting the continuing barriers to
black electoral participation).
225 See Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 807 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) ("[Pllaintiffs
maintain that as a consequence of centuries of racial discrimination, Tennessee's
blacks have suffered under debilitating socioeconomic pressures which account, in
part, for the significantly higher rate of felony convictions-and disenfranchisement-
among blacks as compared to whites."), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
2 6 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 355 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
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3. The Problem with Wesley
Although the court in Wesley conclusively found that "the
historical effects of [socioeconomic and voting] discrimination
against blacks continue to be present," the court held that a causal
nexus between such discrimination and the ex-felon disenfranchis-
ing statute at issue had not been established.2 8  Congress's
rejection of the causal nexus requirement to show the link between
socioeconomic factors and depressed political participation
2 9
should have alerted the court that Congress would disfavor the
causal nexus approach where socioeconomic factors are shown.
More importantly, however, the Wesley court's search for a causal
nexus was clearly misguided.
Instead of looking for a causal link between the ex-felon
disenfranchising statute and black vote dilution, which was the
proper approach, 2 0 the court erroneously searched for "a causal
connection.., between the indicia of historically-rooted discrimina-
tion and the Tennessee statute disenfranchising felons." 23l The
court concluded that despite the presence of totality-of-circumstanc-
es factors, namely voting and socioeconomic discrimination, "these
facts cannot be tied to the historical tradition-and rationale-for
disenfranchising felons."23 2  According to the Wesley court's
reasoning then, plaintiffs bringing § 2 claims would have to show
"2 Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 812 (stating that "the nexus between discriminatory
exclusion of blacks from the political process and disenfranchisement of felons simply
cannot be drawn").
' See supra text accompanying notes 217-18, 220 (noting that where reduced
socioeconomic conditions were shown, Congress and the courts have stated that
depressed electoral participation could be inferred).
' See Whitfield v. Democratic Party, 890 F.2d 1423, 1430 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating
that "a causal connection between the challenged practice.., and the diluted voting
power of the minority must be established").
" Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 812. The Wesley court also misconstrued the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1569
(l1th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984), as imposing upon a defendant "the
burden of denying a causal nexus between the indicia of discrimination and the
challenged practice." Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 812. Instead, Marengo held that "when
there is clear evidence of present socioeconomic or political disadvantage resulting
from past discrimination... the burden is not on the plaintiffs to prove that this
disadvantage is causing reduced political participation, but rather is on [the
defendant] to show that the cause is something else." Marengo, 731 F.2d at 1569.
Thus, the proper focus was on the inferred link between socioeconomic disadvantage
and reduced political participation, not on the link between historical discrimination
and the statute at issue. See also supra text accompanying notes 217-20.
"' Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 812.
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historical evidence of discriminatory motive in the state's adoption
of the statute. However, to require such a showing would, in effect,
return plaintiffs to the intent standard which Congress clearly
rejected with regard to Voting Rights Act claims.
8 8
Instead of dismissing the clearly established proof of discrimina-
tion as not embodying the rationale behind the statute, the court
should have weighed this evidence of discrimination in assessing the
statute's effects on the black vote. As the Supreme Court estab-
lished, "[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law,
practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions
to cause an inequality in the [electoral] opportunities enjoyed by
black and white voters."8 4 It is this interaction that is the proper
focus of judicial review.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit in Wesley held that evidence of
historical discrimination could not "in the manner of original sin,
condemn action that is not in itself unlawful." 235 Apparently
arguing that historical discrimination alone could not demonstrate
the unlawfulness of the ex-felon disenfranchising statute, the court
again failed to properly analyze the combined effects of such
discrimination and the statute on the black vote. As Congress
determined, "the question whether the political processes are
'equally open' depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the
'past and present reality.'" 2 6 Thus, evidence of historical discrimi-
nation and its lingering effects should not have been so hastily
disregarded. In essence, the court assumed that ex-felon disenfran-
chisement is lawful regardless of its results. If the court had
properly weighed the evidence of historical discrimination, it might
have concluded that those results rendered the statute unlawful
under the Voting Rights Act.
Future courts called upon to address vote dilution claims against
ex-felon disenfranchisement should learn from the mistakes of the
"3 See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's rejection
of the intent requirement set by the Supreme Court in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980)). As Congress clearly stated, "If the plaintiff proceeds under the 'results test,'
then the court would assess the impact of the challenged... practice on the basis of
objective factors, rather than making a determination about the motivations which lay
behind its adoption or maintenance." S. REP. NO. 417, supra note 9, at 27, reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205.
- Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (emphasis added).
Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980)).
"6 S. REP. No. 417, supra note 9, at 30 reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207
(quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973)).
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Wesley courts. The following Section suggests a possible approach
for courts to pursue in determining whether vote dilution has
occurred.
D. Suggested Judicial Analysis of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement
Vote Dilution Claims Under the Voting Rights Act
Although reform of ex-felon disenfranchisement can be achieved
either through the courts or by legislative action, "the courtroom
obviously presents the more accessible forum for the individual ex-
offender."3 7 This is especially true in cases of black vote dilution,
since § 2 of the Voting Rights Act is primarily enforced by lawsuits
and "does not depend upon voluntary compliance nor is it self-
executing. "211 In addressing § 2 vote dilution claims against ex-
felon disenfranchisement, courts should rely upon the totality of
circumstances approach previously discussed."5 9
Statistics showing a disproportionate impact of ex-felon
disenfranchisement on blacks should not be used solely to direct
judicial inquiry into vote dilution analysis24 and then be discard-
ed, but should be analyzed with the other relevant factors in the
totality of circumstances evaluation. Where figures show that the
number of black ex-felons per black voting age population is
disproportionately high24 -and that, derivatively, ex-felon disen-
franchisement disproportionately impacts the black vote-this
evidence should be used to ascertain the possible compounding
influence of felon disenfranchisement on the persistent vote-diluting
effects of historical voting and socioeconomic discrimination. As
previously stated, plaintiffs should also be allowed to introduce
persuasive constitutional and social policy/theory arguments to
demonstrate the tenuousness of a state's underlying policy for
disenfranchising ex-felons.
242
2 7Itzkowitz & Oldak, supra note 7, at 740.
Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Represen-
tation, in CoNTROvERsIEs IN MiNORrY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN
PERSPECTIVE 66, 84 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
"' See supra part Im.C.
21 See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining that numbers showing
impact should automatically prompt courts to inquire into the interaction of historical
and political factors with the challenged legislation).
2" Again, disparate targeting and treatment should not be overlooked as possible
reasons for the disproportionate number of black ex-felons.2
1 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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Where a plaintiff presents statistics that clearly demonstrate an
impact,28 and there is strong evidence of historical voting and
socioeconomic discrimination, the effects of which still greatly
hinder black political participation and are compounded by ex-felon
disenfranchisement, the court should deem these factors to work in
conjunction with the challenged ex-felon disenfranchising statute to
deny blacks an equal opportunity to participate in the political
process, thereby unlawfully diluting the black vote in violation of
the Voting Rights Act.
Additional evidence, in the form of the other totality of circum-
stances factors and/or other unenumerated factors that are relevant
in certain cases, should also enter into courts' analyses. Because
facts and circumstances will vary with each case, establishing
threshold figures for impact 44 or the specific number of facts
needed to constitute "strong" evidence of discrimination would be
unwise. Courts should therefore apply this analysis on a case-by-case
basis.
With regard to appropriate relief, the Fifth Circuit has reasoned
that where a violation of the Voting Rights Act has been established,
"courts should make an affirmative effort to fashion an appropriate
remedy for that violation."24 As stated in the Act's legislative
history, "[t]he court should exercise its traditional equitable powers
to fashion the relief so that it completely remedies the prior dilution
of minority voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity for
minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their
choice."2 46 Thus, the Voting Rights Act does not prescribe any
exact form of relief for vote dilution and such relief apparently must
be determined on a case-by-case basis, in a manner best suited to
correct the particular vote dilution involved.24  The plaintiff in
Wesley sought injunctive and declaratory relief,248 which in some
24 Where the number of black ex-felons per black voting age population is
disproportionately high compared to the number of white ex-felons per white voting
age population, there is obvious disproportionate impact on the black vote.
244 1 cannot suggest definite numbers or ratios to establish an impact standard,
since these will vary from case to case, and impact is a relative concept.
245 Monroe v. City of Woodville, 819 F.2d 507, 511 n.2 (5th Cir. 1987).
246 S. REP. No. 417, supra note 9, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 208.
24' 7 See id. (stating that vote dilution remedies will "necessarily depend upon widely
varied proof and local circumstances").
24" Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 804 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d
1255 (6th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, as the Sixth Circuit in Wesley pointed out, "any
relief afforded to Wesley would inure to the benefit of all others who stand to be
injured by the state's conduct, namely, black citizens of Tennessee convicted of
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cases may be the best remedy for vote dilution caused by ex-felon
disenfranchisement. Such relief, however, may not be appropriate
in all cases, and future courts addressing these claims should
fashion remedies according to the particular circumstances of each
case.
Most importantly, unlike the Wesley courts which seemed to
dismiss the possibility of a violation without thoroughly and
correctly weighing the evidence, 249 courts should recognize the
potential of ex-felon disenfranchisement to unlawfully dilute the
black vote. Once courts acknowledge this potential, they can
effectively address and correct any resultant impediment to effective
black electoral participation.
CONCLUSION
The right to vote serves as the embodiment of political empow-
erment, and it is essential to the full privilege of effective citizen-
ship. Given the fundamental importance of the right to vote, the
issue of ex-felon disenfranchisement will continue to be a hotbed of
dispute. Wesley, the first case to address the special problem of
black vote dilution in the context of ex-felon disenfranchisement,
will undoubtedly prompt future challenges to the removal of ex-
offenders' voting rights, especially given the ongoing, vote-impacting
effects of discrimination in this country.
Where legislatures fail to repeal old laws that infringe such
fundamental rights as voting, and that since their adoption may
have become unlawful under statutory developments, courts should
take "a 'second look' [through] the eyes of the people" 250 directly
and indirectly affected by such laws, and take steps to correct their
harmful effects. To the extent that it may, in some circumstances,
unlawfully dilute the black vote, ex-felon disenfranchisement
deserves this second look.
felonies." Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1258 (6th Cir. 1986). Thus, according
to the Sixth Circuit, relief afforded to one black felon would extend to the entire class
of black felons and would therefore presumably correct the black vote dilution
problem.249 See Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 813 ("Disenfranchising the felon has never been
attributed to discriminatory exclusion of racial minorities from the polls."); Wesley,
791 F.2d at 1261 (dismissing "evidence of past discrimination" and determining that
Tennessee's "legitimate and compelling rationale for enacting the statute" lead to "the
inescapable conclusion that the Voting Rights Act was not violated"); see also supra
part M.C.3 (discussing the "problem with Wesley").
0 Calabresi, supra note 131, at 104.
1994] 1189

